Piloting pro-poor support strategies in Banteay Meas district by Murta, J et al.
This learning brief summarises 
a review of the pro-poor 
support mechanism for 
sanitation in Banteay Meas 
District carried out by the 
Institute for Sustainable Futures 
(ISF), University of Technology 
Sydney and SNV in October 
and November 2016, in 
consultation with the Ministry 
of Rural Development (MRD) 
and the District Office of Rural 
Development (DoRD).
1. ID Poor is the standardised system used in Cambodia to identify poor households led by the Ministry of Planning which uses two 
categories, ID Poor 1 (very poor) or ID Poor 2 (poor).
When the Sustainable Sanitation and 
Hygiene for All (SSH4A) programme 
commenced in Cambodia, the sanitation 
coverage in Banteay Meas was one of the 
lowest in Cambodia (16%) and over 90%  
of ID Poor households in the district 
practiced open defecation.
Within 18 months of implementing the 
programme’s district-wide approach, without 
hardware subsidies, access to improved 
sanitation across the district had doubled. 
However, progress among the poor remained 
comparatively slow. Innovative solutions to reach 
the poor while working within the government 
system were needed. SNV, therefore, piloted a 
pro-poor support mechanism targeted at 
ID Poor1 households. Overall, 1,628 households 
across the 15 communes of Banteay Meas 
district accessed vouchers through this 
mechanism, which allowed them to build or 
upgrade to a pour flush toilet at reduced cost 
(see Box 1). 
This pro-poor support mechanism contributed to 
an increase in sanitation coverage, particularly 
for the “last mile”, as the district approached 
open defecation free (ODF) status. In November 
2016, Banteay Meas was declared the first ODF 
district in Cambodia.
In concurrence with the MRD, and with oversight 
and technical assistance from SNV, local 
government actors at the village, commune, 
district and provincial levels had key roles in the 
implementation and management of  
the mechanism.
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Box 1: How did the pro-poor support mechanism work? 
Eligibility criteria: The mechanism 
consisted of a fixed amount hardware 
subsidy offered in the form of a time-bound 
discounted pour flush latrine to ID Poor 
households in communes that had reached 
80-100% sanitation coverage. Both ID Poor 
1 (very poor) and ID Poor 2 (poor) in the 
government’s system of identification of poor 
households were eligible. 
 
Amount of the discount: The discount 
was based on a cost agreed with selected 
sanitation suppliers of US$44 for a pour 
flush latrine. This included a three-ring pit, 
a slab and a toilet pan. The discounted toilet 
price offered to ID Poor 1 households was 
US$12.50 and to ID Poor 2 households was 
US$18.70. SNV reimbursed the suppliers for 
the cost of the discount after confirmation 
from the commune council that the household  













Confirmation of toilet built verified 
by district and provincial government 














Strengths of the  
pro-poor mechanism
Local leadership and commitment
Significant effort was invested by SNV in 
creating leadership capacity and commitment 
for sanitation outcomes before the subsidy 
was introduced as part of the broader SSH4A 
programme. Government stakeholders at the 
national and local levels appreciated this effort 
and the leadership provided by SNV. 
The pilot followed a decentralised approach and 
built on this capacity and commitment by using 
existing local leadership roles and processes to 
deliver the subsidy. It brought provincial, district 
and community level leaders together to share 
responsibilities. This facilitated provincial and 
district officials to get closer to the grassroots 
and understand first-hand the challenges 
and difficulties experienced by communities, 
particularly by the poor. The commune eligibility 
criterion of achieving 80% sanitation coverage 
was also highlighted as a key-enabling factor  
in generating leadership motivation  
and commitment.
“We need strong support from local government. 
It cannot be national level only. The project  
used local leadership mechanisms…the village 
council and the commune council owned the 
process.” (MRD)
Effective technical support and  
capacity building
Technical support and capacity building specific 
to the pro-poor mechanism included an 
orientation meeting to train those involved in 
the implementation. This was followed by district 
and commune level meetings during which 
further technical support was provided for the 
project. In total, three district level meetings 
were conducted and three to five meetings were 
conducted per commune.
“[we received] very good technical support 
from SNV about how to facilitate meetings… 
very hands on learning.” 
(Banteay Meas District Government)
Emphasis on reflection and learning 
from failure
The district and commune level meetings 
held regularly throughout the project included 
participatory reflection processes to learn from 
strengths and barriers and to improve the 
mechanism. At these reflection meetings, local 
leaders had to report on progress against plans 
and this revealed cases in which progress was 
slow. This approach was effective in creating 
peer-pressure among local leaders and further 
encouraging their leadership and commitment.
“We stepped back and reflected together on what 
worked well and what didn’t. If, during this, 
we found a commune going slower than others, 
then we would focus on these.”  
(Banteay Meas District Government)
Emphasis on outreach to households
Village meetings and regular and frequent  
door-to-door visits by commune and village focal 
points were conducted to inform households 
about the discount and persuade them to use it. 
Most of the survey respondents said they heard 
about the discount through village meetings 
(82%) and/or through commune or village focal 
points (70%).
“Home door-to-door was very important. 
Not just a one time meeting”. (Banteay Meas 
District Government)
Strong accountability mechanisms  
and close monitoring
The mechanism delivery process set up a chain 
of accountability relationships between the 
different parties involved. The supplier was 
only paid by SNV upon confirmation of the 
construction of the toilet by the household. 
This was provided by the commune chief and 
verified by the district and provincial level 
government teams. Therefore, the commune 
chief was accountable to the Provincial 
Department of Rural Development (PDRD) and 
the Department of Rural Development (DoRD), 
SNV and the supplier. In turn, the village chief 
was accountable to the commune chief and the 
household was accountable to the village focal 
points (VFPs). The VFPs had to report progress 
of toilet construction to the commune chief 
who would spot-check this. The household was 
accountable to the VFPs through the signing 
of an agreement on the date of the latrine 
construction. This process was supported by 
a range of monitoring and verification tools 
prepared by SNV for each actor.
Transparent process
Key aspects that contributed to the transparency 
of the process included clear and simple 
household eligibility criteria and clear roles 
and responsibilities combined with the strong 
accountability mechanisms described above.
“The project ran smoothly and transparently…
not much [room for] error in selecting the wrong 
person. If people were not in the [ID poor] 
list then they could not apply. The structure 
to manage the project had very clear roles 
and responsibilities, and the process to collect 




How effective was the mechanism in 
reaching ID Poor households?
The mechanism was well-designed to target 
ID Poor households and made an important 
contribution to improvements in access to 
improved sanitation among the ID Poor. Of 
these, half benefited from the mechanism and a 
small proportion (11%) already had a pour flush 
latrine when the mechanism was
introduced, the majority of which was built 
during SSH4A program implementation. 
However, not all of those who did not already 
have access to improved sanitation chose to 
take up the latrine discount. This was the case of 
38% of the ID poor. The most common reported 
reason was that they could not afford the 
contribution (Figure 1).












Don’t own or lack of land 
to build a toilet 
Other
Did not know how to 
apply for a voucher 
Could afford the contri-
bution but could not 
afford labour or access 
to free labour/help 
Did not know about the 
voucher offer
Could not afford to pay 
the required amount
ID Poor 1 ID Poor 2 Total
Amongst these households may have not 
managed to access or borrow money from 
their migrant family members or others within 
the timeframe of the mechanism and the time 
required to build the toilet (1.3 weeks 
on average).
“If I contribute I cannot delay. There is a lot of 
pressure from the village chief. The time to build 
is very limited, not enough time. My children are 
away. Not enough time to wait for them to come. 
They only come during festivities. I discussed 
with them but they couldn’t come in the time 
required.” (ID poor household)
How critical was the mechanism to 
financially enable ID Poor households to 
build a pour-flush toilet?
The discount is not likely to have been financially 
critical to enable most ID Poor households 
to build a pour flush toilet, but rather, it was 
effective in urging them to build one. The ratio 
between the amount households who benefited 
from the mechanism invested in building a toilet 
and the cost of the discount (US$25.2-US$31.5) 
supports this finding. Beneficiary households and 
non-beneficiary households spent on average 6 
to 7 times (US$159) and 9 to 12 times (US$304) 
the cost of the discount respectively (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Household survey results on amount (US$) 
spent on materials and labour to build a pour flush 
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A key finding from this review was that, in some 
cases, ability to pay for a toilet may be less 
related to actual affordability and more related 
to the migration of the household members who 
have the decision-making power over household 
expenses and/or that can offer free labour. 
Investing in a toilet often required households 
to source funds from migrant family members, 
friends or micro-finance institutions (MFIs). This 
required some effort and coordination, which the 
household may be willing to make to be able to 
access a cheaper latrine if this is offered within a 
time-bound period.
To what extent did the mechanism 
support long-term behaviour  
change outcomes?
A key strength of the mechanism was that 
it fostered local leadership and commitment 
to sanitation beyond broader SSH4A WASH 
governance efforts, which is critical if long-term 
behaviour change is to be sustained. This was 
achieved by involving and bringing provincial, 
district and community level leaders together as 
key implementers of the mechanism. This also 
made them accountable for their responsibilities, 
and provided them with technical and capacity 
building support.
The 80% sanitation coverage eligibility criterion 
was also key to generate motivation and 
commitment from those in leadership positions. 
This requirement may have also worked in 
favour of ensuring that SSH4A behaviour change 
and demand generation activities conducted 
before the mechanism were effective in 
motivating non-poor households in particular to 
build toilets.
In addition to fostering local leadership and 
commitment for sanitation, the mechanism 
further supported long-term behaviour change 
outcomes by requiring a significant monetary 
contribution from the households ensuring that 
only those who genuinely wanted a toilet took up 
the discount. 
Sustaining long-term behaviour change 
requires ensuring that the local leadership 
and commitment generated is continued after 
ODF is achieved. A degree of local leadership 
commitment to support ID Poor households 
in the post-ODF phase was evident in some 
communes. However, this seemed to be a 
result of broader SSH4A efforts rather than 
specific mechanism strategies to ensure ID Poor 
households maintain and upkeep their  
sanitation facilities. 
Could the mechanism be scaled up 
across the country at a reasonable cost 
by the government?
In the current context of institutional governance 
for sanitation, the mechanism is not likely to 
be scalable across the country at a reasonable 
cost. The NAP estimates that approximately 
US$36 will be required per household to reach 
60% access to improved sanitation by 2018. 
Although the mechanism’s minimum unit cost is 
not significantly higher than this (Figure 3), it is 
likely that its actual cost is.
Figure 3: Minimum costs if the mechanism versus the 
NAP estimated public funding for sanitation
Minimum cost of pro-poor 
support mechanism 
Estimated cost required 
to achieve NAP goals 
US$47 US$36
This minimum cost does not account for SNV 
staff time nor does it reflect all of the time 
contributions from government stakeholders. 
Further, it took place within the context of an 
investment by the broader SSH4A programme 
towards achieving ODF and not in isolation. In 
addition, the mechanism’s hardware costs were 
based on a US$44 basic pour flush toilet, which 
might cost more in other locations. This might 
also increase the overall hardware costs of the 
mechanism if the same percentage of discount is 
to be offered. 
Effective scaling up of the mechanism would 
also require the government to ensure this was 
implemented in a consistent way by the various 
development partners following the National 
Guiding Principles on Hardware Subsidies for 
Rural Household Sanitation.
To what extent did the mechanism 
avoid risks of distorting the existing and 
potential market?
The mechanism was effective in avoiding 
leakage to non-targeted households. This was 
achieved through narrow targeting of the ID 
Poor and a close monitoring and verification 
system that promoted accountability and 
transparency between the different actors 
involved in implementing the mechanism. The 
review did not reveal any evidence of market 
distortion among non-poor households. Instead, 
the contrary seemed to have happened: non-
poor households may have been motivated to 
purchase toilets by seeing poorer households 
purchasing them.
“Non-poor feel embarrassed if the ID Poor have a 
toilet and they don’t.” (CFP commune)
However, the mechanism had a market distortion 
effect for suppliers because it created a toilet 
price expectation in the market. Furthermore, 
it did not account for business cost increases, 
which may have implications for the quality of 
the toilets produced by the suppliers, as these 
try to reduce costs to maintain a certain profit.
The review also found that the mechanism did 
not encourage suppliers to innovate on their 
business models to reach new ID Poor household 
markets and low-cost technologies. On the other 
hand, suppliers may need support with technical 
as well as marketing and business model skills to 
be able to innovate on these aspects. CSOs can 
play a role in providing such support as part of 
their pro-poor support strategies.
“We cannot increase the price because everyone 
knows it’s US$44.” (Supplier)
Key recommendations
The mechanism is not likely to be scalable at 
a reasonable cost nationally until significant 
institutional and human resource capacity 
improvements within local government are 
observed. However, it can be applied elsewhere 
at a smaller scale, such as at a district level, 
and can be a very effective way to fast-track 
progress towards ODF status. In such cases, 
the potential risks of market distortion among 
suppliers and of stifling innovation need to be 
carefully considered and addressed. Post-ODF 
strategies to support the ID Poor households to 
build and/or upkeep their sanitation facilities also 
need careful consideration.
The following are recommended as 
considerations for alternative or complementary 
pro-poor support approaches to the mechanism:
• Providing ID Poor households with stronger 
and customised support to plan and prioritise 
investments in household expenses.
• Working with MFIs to develop financial 
support for sanitation targeted at 
ID Poor households.
• Working with and supporting suppliers to 
develop pro-poor or social enterprise business 
models. For example, this can include offering 
instalment payments or time-bound discounts 
or special offers for ID Poor households cross-
subsidised from sales to other customer or 
market segments (e.g. non-poor households). 
Different forms of offers could be explored 
(e.g. discounts for large purchases, free 
transport, buy one get one free, free gift with 
a purchase, referral offers, first time shopper 
offer, customer loyalty offers, early payment 
discounts and seasonal discount in the times 
of the year when the sales are typically slow).
• Providing incentives to suppliers to develop 
pro-poor business models to reach ID Poor 
customers. Incentives can include awards for 
a certain target of ID Poor reached within a 
certain timeframe and naming and praising 
these suppliers at local events or community 
celebrations and in the local media (e.g. 
radio, etc.).
• Working with local government agencies 
responsible for sanitation as well as private 
sector development to support and encourage 
suppliers to develop pro-poor business 
models to reach ID Poor customers.
• Exploring corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) funds as an avenue to support the 
financial viability of social enterprise models 
of suppliers. CSR funds can offer non-trade 
sources of revenue for situations when the 
costs of serving poor households exceed 
revenue from customers, and ensure the 
enterprise is sustained.
Inside Sustainable Sanitation & 
Hygiene for All: 
SNV’s experience working on WASH 
programmes in more than 26 countries 
has shown that strategies such as demand 
creation and sanitation marketing need to 
be embedded in longer-term processes that 
develop sustainable service delivery models 
at scale. Designed to address this need, 
SSH4A supports local government to lead 
and accelerate progress towards district-
wide sanitation coverage with a focus on 
institutional sustainability and learning. 
The SSH4A approach has four integrated 
components supported by performance 
monitoring and learning:
• Capacity for steering and 
implementation of sanitation  
demand creation
• Capacity for sanitation supply  
chains and finance
• Capacity for behavioural  
change communication (BCC)
• Capacity for WASH governance reform.
SNV is a not-for-profit international development 
organisation. Founded in the Netherlands nearly 
50 years ago, we have built a long-term, local 
presence in 39 of the poorest countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Our global team of 
local and international advisors work with local 
partners to equip communities, businesses and 
organisations with the tools, knowledge and 
connections they need to increase their incomes 
and gain access to basic services – empowering 
them to break the cycle of poverty and guide their 
own development. 
Further information 
To learn more about SNV and our work in Cambodia, 
visit our website at www.snvworld.org/en/cambodia
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